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LEGAL ADVERTISING AND WARRANTY
LIABILITY: "LET THE LAWYER BEWARE"
MARC I. STEINBERG*
GERALD E. ROSEN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether the advent of advertising (and perhaps solicitation') will
relegate the legal profession to the level of a commercial enterprise is
one of the major uncertainties to arise from the Supreme Court's deci-
* A.B., 1972, University of Michigan; J.D., 1975, University of California, Los Angeles;
LL.M., 1977, Yale University. Member, California Bar.
** J.D. Candidate, National Law Center, George Washington University.
1. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 98 S. Ct. 1913 (1978); In re Primus, 98 S. Ct. 1893 (1978).
In the Ohralik decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio Supreme Court's action
in disciplining an attorney for in-person solicitation of clients for pecuniary gain. In In re
Primus, however, the Court held that an attorney acted within her first amendment rights in advis-
ing a potential client of her legal rights and subsequently in writing her to advise that free legal
assistance was available. The Court emphasized that in this case, unlike Ohralik, the solicitation
was not for pecuniary gain, but was "undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to ad-
vance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU...." Id. at 1900.
Drawing upon the Court's holdings, one may conclude that a state may fashion reasonable
restrictions upon solicitation. The Court's language in In re Primus supports this assertion:
"The State's special interest in regulating members of a profession it licenses, and who serve as
officers of its courts, amply justifies the application of narrowly drawn rules to proscribe solicita-
tion that in fact is misleading, overbearing, or involves other features of deception or improper
influence." Id. at 1909. See Young, Supreme Court Report, 64 A.B.AJ. 1151 (1978).
For the purposes of this article, it appears that professional solicitation, like advertising, may
well lead to the application of warranty standards. See notes 82-109 yra and accompanying
text; Steinberg & Rosen, Lawyers'Advertirig and Warranties Caveat 4dvocatus, 64 A.B.AJ. 867
(1978).
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sion in Bates v. State Bar.2 Legal commentators have predicted that
possible ramifications from advertising include smaller firms siphoning
off business from larger firms, increased litigation, lower legal fees, in-
creased specialization by members of the bar, and a decline in profes-
sional competence and standards.3
One possible consequence of the Bates decision which has attracted
little, if any, comment, however, is that although lawyers have a first
amendment right to advertise under certain circumstances, the exercise
of this right may result in expanded liability for the rendition of sub-
standard legal services that are procured through such advertising. In
other words, an attorney who holds himself out through public adver-
tisement as a specialist or one otherwise qualified to do the work in-
volved-thereby creating certain reasonable expectations in potential
clients--may be held to have expressly and impliedly warranted the
quality of his product. And, if the quality of the attorney's work does
not meet acceptable standards, he may be liable for breach of warranty.
This article will examine the realistic possibility of expanded lawyer
liability by juxtaposing upon the clearly commercial flavor of legal ad-
vertising, the growing trend expanding warranty application under Ar-
ticle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code by use of analogy.4 It should
2. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
3. See, e.g., Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules andLegaAdverising. The Inplica.
tions ofGoldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 475, 518-21 (1977) (lower legal fees and increased litiga-
tion); Hansen, Lawyers'4dvertsing." Beyond the Yellow Pages, 13 IDAHO L. Rav. 247, 262 (1977)
(increased specialization, increased competition, and lower costs to the consumer); Spann, The
' Idverdisinglssue," 81 CoM. LJ. 381, 381-82 (1976) (commercialization of the profession). Com-
menting on the conflict between traditional views of the legal profession as opposed to its commer-
cialization, Branca & Steinberg made the following remarks with respect to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), which held that attorney minimum
fee schedules were a per se violation of § I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976):
In Gold/arb, the Court recognized a strong consumer interest in the manner in which the
practice of law is conducted. The extent to which the Court is willing to protect this
interest at the expense of relegating the legal profession to the level of a commercial
enterprise remains to be seen. Whatever the eventual result may be, Gold/arb represents
a new judicial attitude toward consumerism and the bar, it invites legislative participa-
tion in resolving the conflict between the bar's desire to be free from the usual constraints
upon commercial enterprise and the public interest in competition.
Branca & Steinberg, sutpra, at 522.
4. Strict liability in tort (under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)) and
the theory of misrepresentation are beyond the scope of this article. The reason for declining to
address these issues is that the plaintiff has a greater possibility of recovering under a warranty
theory. Under an express warranty the plaintiff must prove that the defendant did not fulfill his
representation, and under an implied warranty of merchantability, that his product did not meet
the standards of the profession. Fault, negligence, or accidental events that render the perform-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/1
LEGAL ADVERTISING AND WARRANTY LIABILITY 445
be noted, however, that although this work focuses on attorney liabil-
ity, the principles stated apply with equal force to other professionals
who advertise.5
For background purposes, the article begins with a discussion of
warranty liability in general. Next, it examines the traditional
problems inherent in the extension of warranties to "service" transac-
tions. Then, the work analyzes the recent and growing trend toward
expansion of warranty liability and considers whether this trend should
be extended to lawyers and other professionals who advertise.
II. WARRANTY LIABILITY IN GENERAL
An analysis of judicial application of the Uniform Commercial Code
to cases involving the furnishing of legal services reveals that attorneys
have traditionally found three areas of shelter from warranty liability.
First, under the traditional interpretation of the Code, express and im-
plied warranties arise only where there has been a transaction involv-
ing "goods."'6 Because lawyers and other professionals provide
services, they accordingly have not been subject to warranty coverage.7
Second, attorneys, as professionals, generally do not attract clientele
through commercial advertising or solicitation. 8 Third, because of the
ance unmerchantable or the representation unfulfilled provide no defense to the advertising law-
yer sued under a warranty theory.
To recover under a theory of strict liability in tort, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
service was defective in an unreasonably dangerous manner. Although this remedy may be ap-
propriate in a personal injury suit against a physician or dentist, it is not as effective when the
harm is solely economic. The claim of misrepresentation is difficult to substantiate in legal adver-
tising cases because the plaintiff must prove that the lawyer was at least negligent in making his
misrepresentation and, sometimes, that the lawyer intended to mislead.
Under the federal criminal code legislation now pending in Congress, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 1738 (1978), an attorney who advertises with the intent to "deceive or defraud a purchaser"
may be guilty of the offense of consumer fraud.
For a further discussion of these issues, see J. WrTE & R. SUMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM CoMMERcIAL CODE 272, 295 (1972). See also note 53 infra.
5. Presumably based on the Bates decision, physicians and dentists are also beginning to
advertise. See Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1977, at Al, coL 1.
6. U.C.C. § 2-105.
7. See, eg., Gravely v. Providence Partnership, 549 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1977); La Rossa v.
Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968); Thompson Farms, Inc. v. Como Feed Prods.,
366 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. App. 1977); Corceller v. Brooks, 347 So. 2d 274 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Magrine v.
Krasnica, 94 NJ. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), af'dsub nona Magrine v.
Spector, 100 NJ. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968); Perlmutter v. Beth David
Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954); Milau Assocs. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 56 App.
Div. 587, 391 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1977).
8. See, ag., Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 NJ. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969), where the New
Number 3]
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unpredictable nature and complexity of the law, attorneys are liable
only for negligence or intentional misconduct.9 As phrased by Chief
Justice Traynor: "Those who hire [professionals] are not justified in ex-
pecting infallibility, but can expect only reasonable care and compe-
tence. They purchase service, not insurance."10  Consequently,
disgruntled clients traditionally have been relegated to negligence ac-
tions for redress of their grievances. To recover, the plaintiff had to
show not only that counsel was negligent, but also that but for this
negligence, he would have prevailed." This burden has frequently
proven insurmountable. 2
Before considering the prospects of imposing warranty liability on
attorneys who advertise or solicit, it is necessary to review the tradi-
tional definitions and applications of warranties and then to trace the
trend of expanded warranty application. The Uniform Commercial
Code recognizes two kinds of warranties: (1) express13 and (2) implied,
which in turn is divided into two categories: (i) the implied warranty of
merchantability 4 and (ii) the implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose. 15 Because the fitness for a particular purpose warranty
requires that the seller both have reason to know the buyer's particular
Jersey Supreme Court said in dictum that warranty liability should not apply to physicians and
dentists because they are professionals and "[do] not and cannot advertise for patients." Id. at
596, 258 A.2d at 702. See also Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 627, 633,
650 (1973).
9. See Lucas v. Harm, 56 CaL 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), a widely
criticized decision in which the California Supreme Court held that an attorney who failed to
consider the rule against perpetuities, resulting in invalidation of a will, was not liable for negli-
gence because the complexity of the rule made it a confusing trap for many attorneys. Id. at 592,
364 P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826. See also Doff v. Relles, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966);
Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963); House v. Maddox, 46 II. App. 3d
68, 360 N.E.2d 580 (1977); Corceller v. Brooks, 347 So. 2d 274 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Babbitt v.
Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, 41 N.W. 417 (1889); Denzer v. Rouse, 48 Wis. 2d 528, 180 N.W.2d 521
(1970).
10. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 489, 275 P.2d 15, 20-21 (1954) (citations omitted).
11. See Eckert v. Schanl, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 58 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819-20 (1967); Gillen,
Legal Afalpractice, 12 WASHBuRN L.J. 281, 292 (1973); Comment, supra note 8, at 664-66.
12. See Note, AttorneyMalpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1292, 1311-12 (1963). Butsee Rott-
man & Stern, Purchasing Lawyer falpractice Insurance, 19 PRAc. LAW. 19 (1973), where the
authors note that the number of attorney malpractice suits in recent years has increased with a
corresponding increase in the amount and number of settlements and judgments. Another com-
mentator asserts that the increase in malpractice actions is due largely to the greater sophistication
of the average consumer, the widespread availability of malpractice insurance, and the increased
complexity and specialization of the profession. Gillen, supra note 11.
13. U.C.C. § 2-313.
14. Id § 2-314.
15. Id § 2-315.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/1
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purpose and that the buyer is relying on his expertise,16 this warranty
will seldom arise in the typical attorney advertising or solicitation con-
text. 17  Accordingly, this work primarily considers express warranties
and implied warranties of merchantability.
Turning first to express warranties, section 2-313 of the Code pro-
vides that to recover under this theory the plaintiff must show that the
seller made an affirmation of fact or promise, or offered a description,
sample, or model which related to the goods and became "part of the
basis of the bargain." ' Although the section does not require plaintiff
to show reliance upon the seller's representation for it to become part of
the basis of the bargain,' 9 courts, nevertheless, tend to be influenced by
a showing of reasonable reliance.' Further, the text of section 2-313
and the accompanying comments reveal that express warranties rest on
the dickered aspects of a transaction and that affirmations, promises,
or descriptions that relate to the goods create the warranties.21
16. Id Section 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judg-
ment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified under the
next section, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
White and Summers note that the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose "is narrower,
more specific, and more precise" than the implied warranty of merchantability. See J. WHITE &
R. SUMMERs, supra note 4, at 297-99.
Reliance is an essential element of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Not
only must the buyer rely on the seller's skill and judgment, but the seller must: (1) have reason to
know the buyer's particular purpose, Brescia v. Great Rd. Realty Trust, 373 A.2d 1310, 1312
(N.H. 1977); and (2) have reason to know that the buyer is relying on his skill and judgment.
Lewis & Sims, Inc. v. Key Indus., Inc., 16 Wash. App. 619, 621, 557 P.2d 1318, 1321 (1976).
17. This, however, does not mean that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
can never arise from legal advertising. An example of such a warranty is provided in the last
section of this article. See text accompanying notes 107-09 infra.
18. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 277.
19. Under the Uniform Sales Act (the predecessor to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code), to recover in an express warranty case, the plaintiff had to show that he relied on the
seller's statement. Section 12 of the Act provided: "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the
seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or
promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying
thereon. . . ." (emphasis added). The Uniform Commercial Code has dispensed with the reli-
ance requirement. See note 21 infra.
20. White and Summers observe that reliance remains a relevant factor because courts have
difficulty defining the "basis of the bargain." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 278; see
Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 IML App. 3d 530, 358 N.E.2d 382 (1976).
21. See U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3, which provides in pertinent part:
Affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as
part of the description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements
need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The point most relevant to this inquiry is that it is settled law that
advertisements can create express warranties.22 Courts have arrived at
this conclusion not only because the consumers' vigilance has been
lulled through such advertising,23 but also because advertisements cre-
ate expectations on the part of the buyer that induce him to use and
rely upon a particular product.24 By advertising, the seller makes an
affirmation of fact, promise, or description that relates to the goods
and forms part of the basis of the bargain.25
Turning next to recovery under the implied warranty of
merchantability, section 2-314 requires that a plaintiff show that: (1) he
purchased the product from a merchant, (2) the product was not "mer-
chantable" at the time of acquisition, (3) he incurred damages to him-
self or his property that were caused in fact and proximately by the
product, and (4) he notified the seller of his injury.26  The
"merchant!"2 requirement is satisfied when the seller has held himself
out as having knowledge or skill relevant to the practices involved in
the transaction.2  Lawyers, with their highly specialized training, fall
within this definition.29
which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement, requires clear af-
firmative proof. The issue normally is one of fact.
22. See J. WHrrE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 4, at 279-80; Palmer, Express WarrantiesArlsing
from Advertising, 41 J. Am L. & CoM. 497 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Nalbandian v. Byron Jackson Pumps, Inc., 97 Ariz. 280, 287, 399 P.2d 681, 686
(1965) (Lockwood, CJ., concurring); Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, 38, 467 P.2d
256, 262 (1970) (Jacobson, J., concurring).
24. In Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), perhaps the landmark
case on advertising warranties, the Washington Supreme Court stated:
It would be unjust to recognize a rule that would permit manufacturers of goods to
create a demand for their products by representing that they possess qualities which they,
in fact, do not possess and then.. . deny the consumer the right to recover if damages
result from the absence of those qualities, when such absence is not readily noticeable.
Id. at 459, 12 P.2d at 412. See also Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F.
Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Harris v. Belton, 258 Cal. App. 2d 595, 65 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1968);
Capital Equip. Enterprises, Inc. v. North Pier Terminal Co., 117 l. App. 2d 264, 254 N.E.2d 542
(1969); Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 352 N.E.2d 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Hawkins Constr. Co. v.
Matthews Constr. Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973); Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc.,
165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957); Eddington v. Dick, 87 Misc. 2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 180
(Geneva City Ct. 1976); Klages v. General Ordinance Equip. Corp., 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 356, 367
A.2d 304 (1976).
25. A difficult distinction to draw is whether the seller's statement constitutes a warranty or is
merely "puffing." See note 109 infra.
26. U.C.C. § 2-314.
27. Id. subsection (1).
28. See id. For a discussion of this definition, see Dolan, The Merchant Class ofArticle 2:
Farmers, Doctors, and Others, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, 1030 (1968).
29. See J. WHrTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 289. U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment 2 states inhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/1
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Plaintiff must next show that the goods were not "merchantable."
The most widely used standard of "merchantability" is that the goods
be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." 30
Thus, a merchantable automobile should be fit for normal city and
highway driving,3 , but need not be fit for drag racing. Further, one
can determine a standard of merchantability by looking to trade cus-
tom and usage32 or to the price charged by the merchant.3 It must be
emphasized, however, that a good can be merchantable and yet fall
short of perfection. A lawyer can try a lawsuit in a merchantable man-
ner-4 but still lose, or provide merchantable advice that fails to benefit
his client. The criterion is not perfection, but whether the lawyer's per-
formance would "pass without objection" in the trade. 5
The third factor relevant to recovery under section 2-314 is that the
buyer need not prove that he actually relied on the merchant's expertise
nor that he communicated a particular purpose to the merchant. 6
Rather, reliance is replaced by the implicit requirement that the seller
be a dealer in the kind of goods sold. It is then conclusively presumed
that the buyer relied on the merchant's skill and judgment in deciding
to purchase the good. 37  A lawyer may be analogously described as a
dealer in legal services.
pertinent part: "The professional status under the definition may be based upon specialized
knowledge as to the goods, specialized knowledge as to business practices, or specialized knowl-
edge as to both ...
30. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c). See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 293; see
also McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.W. Va.), aft'd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
31. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
32. See Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
33. Comment 7 to U.C.C. § 2-314 provides: "In cases of doubt as to what quality is intended,
the price at which a merchant closes a contract is an excellent index of the nature and scope of his
obligation under the present section." See, e.g., Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16
Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976); Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va.
818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
Other factors relevant to the determination of merchantability include the quality of goods of
the same class produced by other manufacturers and whether the good complies with government
standards and regulations. See Woodbury Chem. Co. v. Holgerson, 439 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir.
1971).
34. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 288-89.
35. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a); see, e.g., Dillard Smith Constr. Co. v. Greene, 337 So. 2d 841 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Corceller v. Brooks, 347 So. 2d 274 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Keown v. West
Jersey Title & Guar. Co., 147 NJ. Super. 427, 371 A.2d 370 (1977).
36. See Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 1976); J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 4, at 286-96.
37. See Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv.
653 (1957).Washington University Open Scholarship
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These factors traditionally have been considered only in connection
with transactions involving the sale of goods, and as noted earlier,
courts have been reluctant to extend warranty liability to transactions
involving services. This distinction has tended to insulate lawyers and
other professionals who advertise from liability. The following section
will explore the traditional problems and considerations that courts
have weighed in gradually extending warranties to service transactions.
III. EXTENSION OF WARRANTIES TO SERVICE TRANSACTIONS
Although Article 2 applies only to the sale of goods, 38 Comment 2 to
section 2-313 explicitly states that the adoption of the Code should not
disturb the developing case law extending warranties to nonsale trans-
actions by use of analogy.39 Many courts, however, have been reluc-
tant to accept this invitation, particularly in cases involving pure
service transactions.' Further, an examination of the pertinent case
law reveals that a significant number of courts have been unwilling to
apply warranty standards even in cases involving "hybrid" transactions,
which entail the furnishing of both goods and services.41
As a general rule, courts have been more receptive to arguments for
extending liability-either by categorizing the contract as a sale of
goods or by use of analogy-when the hybrid transaction is commer-
38. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
39. Comment 2 provides in pertinent part:
mhe warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines
of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to
sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract .... [Tihe matter is left to the
case law with the intention that the policies of this Act may offer useful guidance in
dealing with further cases as they arise.
40. See, eg., Gravely v. Providence Partnership, 549 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1977); La Rossa v.
Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968); Reliable Elec. Co. v. Clinton Campbell Con-
tractors, Inc., 10 Ariz. App. 371, 459 P.2d 98 (1968); Ned v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart &
Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971); Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481,
275 P.2d 15 (1954); Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assocs., 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 259 (1972); Lindner v. Barlow, Davis & Wood, 210 Cal. App. 2d 660, 27 Cal. Rptr. 101
(1962); Roberts v. Karr, 178 Cal. App. 2d 535, 3 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239 (1972); Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, 41 N.W.
417 (1889).
41. See, eg., Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972); Gautier v.
General TeL Co., 234 Cal. App. 2d 302, 44 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1965); Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33
Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221 (C.P. 1975); Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197
A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963); Nitrin, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 35 IUl. App. 3d 577, 342 N.E.2d 65
(1976); Cutler v. General Elec. Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Hoover v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 270 Ore. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/1
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cial.42 But when the defendant's service in the hybrid transaction is of
a professional character, courts generally have declined to impose war-
ranty liability.43 A few examples will serve to illustrate these points.
A leading case extending warranty liability to a hybrid commercial
transaction is the New Jersey Supreme Court's progressive decision in
42. See, e.g., Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108 (1884); Sampson Constr. Co. v.
Farmers Coop. Elevator Co., 382 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1967); J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. United States, 485
F.2d 588 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 257 (1961); Rifle v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); M.K. Smith Corp. v. Ellis,
257 Mass. 269, 153 N.E. 548 (1926); Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407
(1918); O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1977); Hamilton Fix-
ture Co. v. Anderson, 285 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1973); Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573
(1971); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 NJ. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969); Miller v. Winters, 144 N.Y.S.
351 (Sup. Ct. 1913); Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439, 481 P.2d 924 (1971).
Courts have generally applied warranty standards of liability to two kinds of nonsale commer-
cial transactions--the lease, bailment, or license of goods and the sale or lease of housing. As to
the lease, bailment, or license of goods, see, e.g., KPLR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elecs. Corp., 327 F.
Supp. 315 (W.D. Ark. 1971), modfied, 465 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1972); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing
Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968); Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420
(1970); Whitfield v. Cooper, 30 Conn. Supp. 47, 298 A.2d 50 (Super. Ct. 1972); Johnson Equip.
Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970); Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr.
Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184 (1975); All States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 538 P.2d
1177 (1975); Murray v. Kleen Leen, Inc., 41 11. App. 3d 436, 354 N.E.2d 415 (1976); Cintrone v.
Hertz Truck Rental & Leasing Serv., 45 NJ. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965). See generally Comment,
Strict Liability of the Bailor, Lessor, and Licensor, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 111 (1973).
As to the sale or lease of housing, see, e.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922
(1970) (sale); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 25 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648
(1974) (sale); Duncan v. Shuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 563 P.2d 976 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (sale);
Vernal v. Centralla, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200 (Super. Ct. 1970) (sale); Theis v. Heuer, 280
N.E.2d 300 (Ind. 1972) (sale); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965)
(lease); Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976) (sale); Foisey v. Wyman,
83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973) (lease). See generally Levine, The Warran y of Habitability,
2 CONN. L. REv. 61 (1969); Note, The Home Owners Warranty Prograr An InitialAnalsis, 28
STAN. L. REv. 357 (1976).
For an excellent discussion of the extension of warranty liability by analogy, see Farnsworth,
supra note 37, at 667-69. Some of the reasons Professor Farnsworth cites to explain the advan-
tages of reasoning by analogy include the adjustment of legal principles to changing social condi-
tions, avoidance of the awkward application of sales principles, and extension of warranty
standards to nonsales transactions. Id.
43. See, eg., Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Servs., 506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1975); Mauran v. Mary
Fletcher Hosp., 318 F. Supp. 297 (D. Vt. 1970); Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d
744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977); Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 187 (1971); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971); Magrine v.
Krasnica, 94 NJ. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aft'dsub nom. Magrine v.
Spector, 100 NJ. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aft'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250
A.2d 129 (1969); Ruybe v. Gordon, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); Batiste v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269 (1977); Barbee v. Rogers, 425
S.W.2d 342 (rex. 1968).
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Newmark v. Gimbels, Inc. 44 Plaintiff was injured when an employee at
defendant's beauty salon applied a defective permanent wave solution
to her hair. Acknowledging that the transaction involved both a sale
of goods and the rendering of a service, the court noted that there was
no justifiable reason to limit implied warranty liability to "the intrica-
cies of the law of sales."4 5 In holding the beauty salon liable, however,
the court stated in dictum that public policy would be ill served by
imposing this same warranty liability on physicians and dentists. 6
Countering Newmark is Magrine v. Krasnica,4 an earlier New Jersey
case, in which the court held that a dentist was not liable under an
implied warranty theory when a hypodermic needle broke and became
imbedded in his patient's jaw." Similarly, in Perlmuter v. Be/h David
Hospital,49 although plaintiff contracted homologous serum jaundice
after receiving a blood transfusion at the defendant hospital, he could
not recover. The court found that the transfusion was primarily a serv-
ice and not a transfer of goods; therefore an implied warranty theory
was inapplicable.5" These decisions and others following them5' are
44. 54 NJ. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). Newmark has received extensive commentary. See,
ag., Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Lia-
bility in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 661; Note, Products and the Professional- Strict Liability in the
Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 111 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Products and
the Professional]; Note, The Application of Implied Warranties to Predominantly "Service"
Transactions, 31 OHIO ST. LJ. 580 (1970).
45. 54 N.J. at 594, 258 A.2d at 701.
46. Id at 597, 258 A.2d at 702-03. The court stated: "The beautician is engaged in a com-
mercial enterprise; the dentist and doctor in a profession .... The dentist or doctor does not and
cannot advertise for patients .... Neither medicine nor dentistry is an exact science; there is no
implied warranty of cure or relief." Id. After Newmark, a number of courts extended warranty
liability to hybrid goods-service transactions which were predominantly commercial in character.
See, eg., Jerry v. Borden Co., 45 App. Div. 2d 344, 358 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1974); Ellibee v. Dye, 64
Pa. D. & C. 2d 158 (C.P. 1973); Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439, 481 P.2d 924
(1971).
47. 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), ajf'd sub nom. Magrine v.
Spector, 100 NJ. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), asf'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250
A.2d 129 (1969).
48. Id. at 242, 227 A.2d at 547; accord, Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d
1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971). See also Ruybe v. Gordon, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 889 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1976) (intrauterine device); Cutler v. General Elec. Co., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 300 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1967) (pacemaker); Batiste v. Home Prods. Corp., 32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269 (1977) (oral
contraceptive).
49. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
50. In denying recovery, the court stated: "It was not for blood-or iodine or bandages-for
which the plaintiff bargained, but the wherewithal of the hospital staff and the availability of
hospital facilities to provide whatever medical treatment was considered advisable." Id at 106,
123 N.E.2d at 795. The Perlmutter decision has been widely followed. See, e.g., Heirs of Fruge
v. Blood Serv., 506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1975) (based on Louisiana statute extinguishing causes of
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based on at least two considerations: First, professional services are
experimental in nature and often depend on complex factors beyond
the professional's control. A professional, therefore, should not be
deemed a guarantor of his work.52 Second, the necessity of having
these services readily available to the public outweighs the policy con-
siderations favoring the extension of warranty liability. 3
action arising from blood transfusions); McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 469 F.2d 230 (6th
Cir. 1972) (based on Tennessee statute extinguishing causes of action arising from blood transfu-
sions); Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965) (based on
Perlmutter); Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977)
(based on California statute requiring courts to construe a blood transfusion as a service). Butsee
Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970), where the court held that the
defendant hospital had breached an implied warranty in transfusing the patient with impure
blood. In permitting recovery, the court said it was immaterial whether the transaction was in the
nature of a sale of goods or a service. Id. at 507, 267 A.2d at 870. Accord, Russell v. Community
Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), af'd asmodfed, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla.
1967); Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 M1. 2d 443,266 N.E.2d 897 (1970); Jackson v.
Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 NJ. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967); Reilly v. King County Cent. Blood
Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 246 (1971).
51. In addition to the cases cited in note 50 supra, see, e.g., Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp.,
Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973); Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App.
277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967).
52. See Greenfield, supra note 44, at 686. See also Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co., 275 Ala. 35,
151 So. 2d 767 (1963).
53. See Products and the Professional, supra note 44, at 129-31; Comment, supra note 8, at
634-35. See also Goodman & Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482, 495 (1857); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17
Cal. App. 3d 958, 979, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 393 (1971); Dibblee v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latter-Day
Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 243-44, 364 P.2d 1085, 1087 (1961).
In Newmark, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in dictum, enunciated these considerations:
Defendants suggest that there is no doctrinal basis for distinguishing the services ren-
dered by a beauty parlor operator from those rendered by a dentist or a doctor, and that
consequently the liability of all three should be tested by the same principles. On the
contrary there is a vast difference in the relationships. The beautician is engaged in a
commercial enterprise; the dentist and doctor in a profession. The former caters pub-
licly not to a need but to a form of aesthetic convenience or luxury, involving the rendi-
tion of non-professional services and the application of products for which a charge is
made. The dentist or doctor does not and cannot advertiseforpatient, the demand for his
services stems from a felt necessity of the patient .... Neither medicine nor dentistry
is an exact science; there is no implied warranty of cure or relief. There is no representa-
tion of infallibility and such professional men should not be held to such a degree of
perfection .... Thus their paramount function--the essence of their function-ought
to be regarded as the furnishing of opinions and services. Their unique status and the
rendition of these suigeneris services bear such a necessary and intimate relationship to
public health and welfare that their obligation ought to be grounded and expressed in a
duty to exercise reasonable competence and care toward their patients. In our judg-
ment, the nature of the services, the utility of and the need for them, involving as they
do, the health and even survival of many people, are so important to the general welfare
as to outweigh in the policy scale any need for the imposition on dentists and doctors of
the rules of strict liability in tort.
54 N.J. at 596-97, 258 A.2d at 702-03 (emphasis added). The remedy of strict liability in tort is
most appropriate in cases involving dentists and physicians because plaintiffs usually allege physi-
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Notwithstanding these considerations, some courts and commenta-
tors have urged that warranty liability in pure service transactions be
extended to include professionals. The following discussion develops
this proposition.
IV. TREND TOWARD ExPANsION OF WARRANTY LIABILITY
Despite the traditional "sale of goods" requirement, a minority of
courts have used analogy to expand the warranty coverage of Article 2
to include professional services. A leading case in this area is Guilmel
v. Campbell,54 in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that the evi-
dence presented was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the defend-
ant surgeon had expressly warranted the success of the plaintiff's
operation. The surgeon had told the plaintiff that the operation, which
was to treat a peptic ulcer, would solve his medical problems.5 5 After
the surgery, the plaintiff suffered a ruptured esophagus, contracted hep-
atitis, and lost eighty-two pounds.56 Although finding no ascertainable
negligence, the jury found that the surgeon breached an express war-
ranty. The Michigan Supreme Court held there was sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to have reasonably concluded that the defendant had
contracted to "cure" the plaintiff.
57
cal injury. In legal advertising cases, however, the injury will almost invariably be economic.
Accordingly, the greatest likelihood of recovery will be under a warranty theory. Addressing this
issue, White and Summers note:
The most obvious difference between the two standards [strict liability in tort and im-
plied warranty liability] is that the strict tort standard is considerably narrower in scope.
It does not purport to reach all defective goods but only those that are not only defective
but also "unreasonably dangerous," that is those that have the capacity to cause personal
injury or property damage as opposed to those which cause only economic loss ....
. WHrrE & t SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 295. See Note, Tie.4pp lcation ofImplied Warrantiesto
Predominanly "Service" Transactions, supra note 44, at 593.
54. 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
55. Id. at 62, 188 N.W.2d at 603. According to plaintiff, and apparently accepted by the jury,
the gist of the surgeon's representation was:
Once you have an operation it takes care of all your troubles. You can eat as you want
to, you can drink as you want to, you can go as you please. Dr. Arena and I are special-
ists, there is nothing to it at all-it's a very simple operation. You'll be out of work three
to four weeks at the most. There is no danger at all in this operation. After the opera-
tion you can throw away your pill box. In twenty years if you figure out what you spent
for Maalox pills and doctor calls, you could buy an awful lot. Weigh it against an
operation.
Id at 68, 188 N.W.2d at 606.
56. Id. at 64, 188 N.W.2d at 604.
57. Id. at 69, 188 N.W.2d at 606. Perhaps equally important to the court's finding is the
extent to which the surgeon induced the patient to undergo the operation. The doctor's claim tohttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/1
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Also of interest is the dissenting opinion in Magrine v. Sector,58
the case where a hypodermic needle inserted by the defendant dentist
caused injury. Although the dissenting judge applied strict tort liability
to service transactions,59 his reasoning applies analogously to the exten-
sion of warranty liability to professionals: "As between an innocent pa-
tient and a dentist who causes injury by a defective instrument the law
should require the loss to be borne by the dentist, even if he is not
negligent." °
specialty expertise and his urging of the patient to weigh the costs between having and foregoing
an operation resemble a sales pitch bordering on solicitation. See note 55 supra.
For a discussion of the ramifications of Guilmet, see Note, Torts-Medical Malpractice-Express
Warranty of Particular Results ofan Operation, 41 TENN. L. REv. 964 (1974). Guilmet was se-
verely criticized in Tierney, Contractual Aspects ofMalpractice, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1457 (1973),
where the author contends that under the facts presented liability was wrongfully imposed upon
the defendant surgeon. In light of the court's holding, the author invited
state legislatures to review the rights and duties of professionals and those who deal with
them, and to ensure by statute that a professional will be held to have warranted a partic-
ular result only on the clearest proof, and that his patient or client will have no legal
ground for claiming the benefit of such a warranty in the absence of such proof.
Id. at 1480.
However, other courts, citing Guilmet, followed the Michigan Supreme Court's ruling. See
Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973); Tschirhart v. Pethtel, 61 Mich. App.
581, 233 N.W.2d 93 (1975); Marchlewicz v. Stanton, 50 Mich. App. 344, 213 N.W.2d 317 (1973).
But see Rogala v. Silva, 16 Ill. App. 3d 63, 305 N.W.2d 571 (1973). See also Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d
1221, 1225, 1229-33 (1972).
The Michigan legislature subsequently enacted a statute that in effect overturns Guilmet and
its progeny (but only on the issue of medical care or treatment). The law, 1974 Mich. Pub. Acts
No. 343, amended the Michigan Statute of Frauds, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.922(g) (Supp. 1978), to
render void any "agreement, promise, contract or warranty of cure relating to medical care or
treatment" which is not in writing and signed by the party to be charged or some person author-
ized by him. The amendment took effect December 21, 1974, but, of course, has no application to
contracts entered into before that date.
58. 100 NJ. Super. 223, 225, 241 A.2d 637, 638 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (Botter, J., dis-
senting), af'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
59. Id at 240, 241 A.2d at 646. As authority for this proposition, the dissenting opinion
relied on the reasoning in Farnsworth, supra note 37, at 667-69.
60. I00 NJ. Super. at 225, 241 A.2d at 639. In arguing that liability should be imposed upon
the defendant dentist, the dissenting opinion contended that he was best able to bear the costs of
the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 231, 241 A.2d at 642. In asserting that warranty liability should be
extended to the professional, one commentator said:
Professionals are not engaged in a charitable enterprise. They derive financial benefit
from their work in the same manner as those who render commercial services. In the
usual situation, these individuals can spread their losses to the defective product's manu-
facturer. When this is not possible because of some failing on the defendant's part, then
it seems clear that the defendant, rather than the innocent consumer, should bear the
loss.
Products and the Professional, supra note 44, at 132. See also Murray, Under the SpreadingAnal-
ogV of Article 2 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FOPDHAM L. REV. 447 (1971).
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In Berry v. G. D. Searle & Co.,61 the Illinois Supreme Court also
extended warranty liability to a service transaction. The plaintiff al-
leged that she had suffered a stroke and consequent paralysis as a side
effect of the oral contraceptives that a birth control clinic had pre-
scribed and sold. In the suit against the manufacturer and the clinic,
the court found that the clinic's prescription and dispensation of the
pills constituted a sale and, as such, the transaction carried with it the
Code's warranty provisions.62
Notwithstanding the Berry holding, courts generally have refused to
apply the Code's implied warranties in birth control cases. In Batiste v.
American Home Products Corp.,63 a North Carolina appellate court
found that a physician's prescription of an oral contraceptive to a wo-
man who later suffered a severe stroke, allegedly as a result of taking
the contraceptive, was not covered by the Code's implied fitness and
merchantability warranties. Accordingly, the court held that the phy-
sician was not liable for breach of warranty.'
Similarly, in Ruybe v. Gordon,65 a New York court held that ihe sale
and insertion of an intrauterine device did not carry an implied war-
ranty of merchantability. In reaching its decision, the court relied on
the traditional goods-service and commercial-professional distinctions:
A treating physician who fits a woman with a birth control device at her
request does not thereby become a merchant with respect to the equip-
ment used in treatment. The doctor performs a professional service.
The surgical or therapeutic device he employs is incidental to his medical
treatment. An intrauterine fitting is in the same category as eyeglasses
furnished by an ophthalmologist who treats a patient for diseases and
defects of the eyes. The lenses and frames furnished by the doctor, al-
though included in the fees he charges, are incidental to his management
of the disorder.66
In a nonprofessional context, the Michigan Court of Appeals held
that implied warranties of fitness and merchantability extended to elec-
tric utility services. 67  Although the transaction was commercial and
although the court limited its holding to the sale of electricity, its lan-
61. 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
62. Id. at 554-55, 309 N.E.2d at 554.
63. 32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269 (1977).
64. Id. at 7, 231 S.E.2d at 273.
65. 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
66. Id. at 889-90.
67. Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 329, 196 N.W.2d
316, 318 (1972).
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guage was significantly broad: "[Wle see no reason why the concepts of
implied warranty should depend upon a distinction between the sale of
a good and the sale of a service."
68
In a case involving professional services, the Alabama Supreme
Court held that a group of civil engineers had impliedly warranted the
adequacy of its plans and specifications for the drainage of a proposed
housing project subdivision.69 While recognizing that some courts are
reluctant to impose implied warranty liability upon the contractual
dealings of professionals, the court stated that the ultimate considera-
tion should be "the nature of the employment and the particular serv-
ices to be rendered."70  Referring specifically to lawyers, the court-
expressed doubt that their activities would give rise to implied warranty
liability:
Lawyers, in the practice of their profession, are dependent on the legal
pronouncements of judicial agencies of government. Interpretation of
law is and cannot be an exact and accurate science. There is generally no
formula to follow. Even when Code forms are used in the drafting of a
complaint, questions often arise as to whether or not the correct form for
the client's case has been used. The courts from state to state, and among
the judges on a particular court, often disagree in their interpretation as to
the effect of judicial pronouncements or legislative enactments. Trial
lawyers are dependent on the reactions of jurors to factual presentations
and the application of law thereto.7
The court indicated, however, that depending on the circumstances, an
implied warranty might be imposed:
It is possible that an implied warranty of results by an attorney could exist.
Without committing ourselves, a court might hold that an attorney who is
entrusted with drawing a will and its proper execution impliedly insures
its proper execution by sufficient number of witnesses signing their names
as such-a very simple mandate of law that requires no room for divi-
68. Id. at 329, 196 N.W.2d at 318; accord, Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co. v. Northern Ill. Gas
Co., 16 Ili. App. 3d 638, 306 N.E.2d 337 (1973); Insurance Co. of North America v. Radiant Elec.
Co., 55 Mich. App. 410, 222 N.W.2d 323 (1974). But see Texas State Optical, Inc. v. Barbee, 417
S.W.2d 750 (rex. Ct. App. 1967), af.rdsub norn Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968) (no
implied warranty exists in the fitting of contact lenses because the optometrist renders a profes-
sional service).
69. Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963). For a thorough discus-
sion of the definition of "professionals," see Comment, supra note 8, at 629-33.
70. 275 Ala. at 38, 151 So. 2d at 771.
71. Id., 151 So. 2d at 771.
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sional interpretation.72
More recently, in Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co. ,
the Fifth Circuit extended warranty liability to a manufacturer of cattle
feed supplements who provided professional nutritional advice and
assistance on how to fatten cattle by using its product. In holding that
the Code's implied warranties were applicable, the court relied on the
commercial flavor of the transaction:
[Ralston's] assignment of nutrition consultants .. was designed to pro-
mote increased sales and to cultivate the good will of potential and ex-
isting customers. It is commercially unrealistic to treat separately the sale
of the ration supplement and the rendering of professional advice and
assistance. . . . [If] Texsun relied on those [inaccurate] instructions to its
economic detriment, we can perceive no reason for preventing Texsun's
recovery under a breach of warranty theory.74
Compelling arguments support the logic employed by those courts
that have extended warranty liability by analogy to professional service
transactions. First, the societal interest in preserving the life, safety,
health, and prosperity of its members is independent of the categoriza-
tion of a transaction. Because the same harm may result from either
transaction, there is an equivalent interest in imposing warranty liabil-
ity upon those who provide services as upon those who sell goods.75
Second, regardless of the label placed on a transaction, the defendant
professional usually is better able to predict the merchantability or de-
fectiveness of the good or service.76 Third, the plaintiff's reliance on
the merchant's expertise and reputation is perhaps more extensive and
justified in transactions involving professional services than in those
involving goods. The advent of professional advertising can only in-
crease this reliance. Finally, although the cost of professional liability
insurance is increasing, 7" the defendant professional remains in a better
72. Id. at 39, 151 So. 2d at 771 (emphasis added). Cf. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sordoni
Constr. Co., 401 Pa. 358, 361, 164 A.2d 201, 203 (1960) (architect impliedly warrants the suffi.
ciency of his plans and specifications for a structure's intended purpose and the exercise of ordi-
nary skill and ability in the profession to effectuate the work properly); Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219
S.C. 263, 271, 64 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1951) (party who holds himself out as specially qualified to
perform work of a particular kind impliedly warrants his work in quality and fitness for its in-
tended use). See also Dyess v. Weems, 178 So. 2d 785 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
73. 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971).
74. Id. at 668.
75. See Greenfield, supra note 44, at 688.
76. Id See also Farnsworth, supra note 37, at 672; Products and the Professional, supra note
44, at 131-32.
77. See Rottman & Stern, supra note 12, at 19.
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position to bear the loss than his innocent client or patient. 78
A number of commentators79 including White and Summers 0 have
predicted that courts eventually will extend warranty liability to profes-
sional services. These authorities, however, have urged that courts do
so by analogy rather than by awkwardly stretching the Code's defini-
tion of a sale of goods to encompass the service rendered in a particular
case.81
Although there are sound arguments for the extension of warranties
to professionals, this article will not offer a judgment on that issue.
Rather, the section following asserts that warranty liability should ex-
tend to those lawyers (and other professionals) who engage in commer-
cial advertising and solicitation.
V. LEGAL ADVERTISING AND WARRANTY LIABILITY
The preceding sections have established a foundation upon which to
argue that warranty liability should be extended to attorneys who ad-
vertise or solicit. The first section examined how merchant advertising
may create express or implied warranties.8 2 The second and third sec-
tions indicated that the traditional shelters from warranty liability en-
joyed by professionals may be crumbling as courts become increasingly
receptive to the extension of liability to pure service transactions by use
of analogy.83 On this foundation, the relationship between legal ad-
78. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 495 (4th ed. 1971):
The problem is dealt with as one of allocating a more or less inevitable loss to be charged
against a complex and dangerous civilization, and liability is imposed upon the party
best able to shoulder it. The defendant is held liable merely because, as a matter of
social adjustment, the conclusion is that the responsibility should be his.
79. See, eg., Greenfield, supra note 44, at 707-08; Murray, supra note 60, at 480. Products
and the Professional, supra note 44, at 132. See also note 88 infra (quoting ABA CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITy, EC 2-9).
80. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 288-89.
81. See id.; Greenfield, supra note 44, at 707-08; Murray, supra note 60, at 480; Products and
the Professional, supra note 44, at 132.
82. See notes 18-37 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 38-81 supra and accompanying text. As noted, however, most courts remain
unwilling to extend warranty liability when the nature of the transaction is primarily professional.
This approach does not conflict with the proposition advanced in this article. It is not contended
that warranty liability should extend to all professionals in all circumstances. Rather, it is as-
serted that liability should attach to those professionals who engage in commercial advertising or
solicitation.
It should be noted that traditional bastions of professional privilege are falling rapidly. In
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Supreme Court held attorney minimum
fee schedules to be per se illegal price-fixing. See note 3 supra. The Court has invalidated advertis-
ing bans imposed by statute or by professional associations. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350Washington University Open Scholarship
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vertising and warranty liability will be explored.
Although the Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar14 noted that ad-
vertising claims relating to the quality of services may be inappropri-
ate,"5 it held that price advertising of routine services has first
amendment protection. Further, the American Bar Association's Code
of Professional Responsibility expressly authorizes advertising of an at-
torney's specialty both in the print media and on radio."6 In light of
(1977); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). It has also held that an attorney's solicitation
of clients in certain contexts is protected by the first amendment. In re Primus, 98 S. Ct. 1893
(1978); see note 1 supra.
84. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
85. Id. at 383-84, where the Court noted:
[B]ecause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that
might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite
inappropriate in legal advertising. For example, advertising claims as to the quality of
services-a matter we do not address today-are not susceptible of measurement or
verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant
restriction. (footnotes omitted)
86. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSiONAL RFsPONSIBILrry, DR 2-101(B)(2) (1977). In August
1977 the American Bar Association House of Delegates amended the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility to allow lawyer advertising in the printed media and on radio. (The ABA Code
provisions are, of course, not specifically enforceable upon any lawyer, but serve as a model for
state bar associations and may be adopted by state supreme courts as the appropriate standards
for lawyers in those jurisdictions.)
In adopting standards, the House of Delegates considered two proposals submitted by a special
ABA Task Force on Lawyer Advertising. A regulatory proposal specifically authorized pre-
scribed forms of advertising. A directive proposal took a broader approach and allowed dissemi-
nation of all information that is not "false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive," while providing
guidelines for the determination of improper advertisements. The House of Delegates adopted
the regulatory proposal, but decided that the directive proposal should be distributed to state and
local bar associations for informational purposes.
The amended ABA Code of Professional Responsibility now authorizes printed and radio ad-
vertising that is not "false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory, or [an] unfair state-
ment or claim," ABA CoDE OF PRoFESsIONAL RESPONSIBIMIY, DR 2-101(A), and is "presented
in a dignified manner." Id., DR 2-101(B). A lawyer may advertise the following specialization
information: "One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices, a statement
that practice is limited to one or more fields of law, or a statement that the lawyer or law firm
specializes in a particular field of law practice, to the extent authorized under DR 2-105." Id, DR
2-101(B)(2).
Finally, id., DR 2-105 establishes limits on claims of specialization that lawyers may make:
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist, as practicing in certain
areas of law or as limiting his practice permitted under DR 2-101(B), except as
follows:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office may use the designation "Patents," "Patent Attorney," "Patent Law-
yer," or "Registered Patent Attorney" or any combination of those terms, on
his letterhead and office sign.
(2) A lawyer who publicly discloses fields of law in which the lawyer or the law
firm practices or states that his practice is limited to one or more fields of lawhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/1
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these developments, it is difficult to conclude that an attorney who
avails himself of such advertising is not engaged in a commercial
enterprise.
Considering express warranties first, it should be observed that attor-
neys who advertise that they are specialists and can perform a service
for a stated fee believe that potential clients will be attracted by these
factors. Thus by offering speciality services at reasonable fees, the
attorney's business will become more profitable. Clearly, as long as
the client receives such speciality care at these bargain prices, he too
benefits from this commercialization of the profession. 7  Advertising,
however, adds a new ingredient to the transaction. The consumer ex-
posed to advertising probably believes that the representations made
are true.8  As a result, his vigilance is lulled and he forms a reason-
able-and clearly foreseeable--expectation of receiving specialty serv-
ices at wholesale prices.8 9 These expectations may induce the client to
shall do so by using designations and definitions authorized and approved by
[the agency having jurisdiction of the subject under state law].
(3) A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law or law
practice by [the authority having jurisdiction under state law over the subject
of specialization by lawyers] may hold himself out as such, but only in accord-
ance with the rules prescribed by that authority.
Fees may also be advertised. See id., DR 2-101(B)(22)-(25). Further, a lawyer may expand the
rnformation allowed by applying to and receiving approval from the agency having jurisdiction
under state law. Id., DR 2-101(C).
At this writing, only Maryland, Indiana, Ohio, Colorado, Wisconsin, Louisiana, Mississippi,
and the District of Columbia have set standards for legal advertising. None have adopted verba-
tim the ABA regulatory proposal.
87. See Branca & Steinberg, supra note 3. "Competition would inevitably tend to drive
down prices, raise the level of demand, and perhaps even create demand for new types of service."
Id. at 518-19 (footnotes omitted).
88. The amended ABA Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes that legal advertising
will result in consumer reliance upon the information provided in such advertising:
The lack of sophistication on the part of many members of the public concerning legal
services, the importance of the interests affected by the choice of a lawyer and prior
experience with unrestricted lawyer advertising, require that special care be taken by
lawyers to avoid misleading the public and to assure that the information set forth in any
advertising is relevant to the selection of a lawyer. The lawyer must be mindful that the
benefits of lawyer advertising depend upon its reliability and accuracy. . . . Since law-
yer advertising is calculated and not spontaneous, reasonable regulation of lawyer adver-
tising designed to foster compliance with appropriate standards serves the public interest
without impeding the flow of useful, meaningful, and relevant information to the public.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY, EC 2-9.
89. The Supreme Court in Bates implicitly recognized the consumer's heavy reliance upon
attorney advertising in procuring legal assistance: "We do not foreclose the possibility that some
limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like, might be required of even
an advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so as to assure that the consumer is not misled."
433 U.S. at 384.
An interesting question is whether those attorneys who advertise or solicit for clients for theWashington University Open Scholarship
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seek legal assistance from the advertising attorney. In the absence of
such advertising he might not have developed such aspirations, or he
might have utilized the services of another attorney, or he might have
refrained from employing an attorney altogether.90 In view of the rea-
sonableness and foreseeability of the consumer's reliance, it is only eq-
uitable that the attorney be held to his representation, namely, the
rendering of specialty legal service at the advertised price. Thus the
advertisement creates an express warranty.
The next question that arises is that of the plaintiff's burden of proof.
To recover against the advertising lawyer on a breach of express war-
ranty claim, what must the plaintiff show? Briefly, the plaintiff need
only prove that he did not receive specialty legal assistance or, if such
assistance was rendered, it was not performed at the advertised price.
The issue of negligence is wholly irrelevant. It is no defense that the
client did not receive specialty assistance due to factors beyond the law-
yer's control.91 The inquiry should be limited to whether the client
received the quality of legal assistance customarily practiced by similar
specialists in that community at the price advertised. 92 If, for any rea-
purpose of rendering nonprofit legal assistance should be held to the same warranty standards.
The pro bono attorney ordinarily does not advertise either fees or specialization. Instead, because
presumably motivated by social or public policy considerations, he does not induce reliance by
statements about the quality of his services. He informs the public only that his services are
available at affordable cost. Accordingly, because fewer representations are made, the poverty
lawyer probably should not be held to the same warranty standards. See generally fn re Primus,
98 S. Ct. 1893 (1978).
90. See J. WmT & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 272. See also note 4 rupra.
91. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
92. See general, Note, supra note 12, where the commentator contended that this legal stan-
dard was not being applied by the courts:
The crucial question whether the average attorney in the defendant's position would
have acted as did the defendant is most often answered without actually judging the
defendant's conduct against the only reasonable standard, that of the skill and diligence
customarily exercised by other attorneys in the same community. The defense that mere
"errors of judgment" were made has generally been sustained uncritically. The defend-
ant should be required to demonstrate that his choice of alternatives, though subse-
quently revealed to be mistaken, was not unreasonable, for only then is the allegation of
negligence rebutted.
The difficult problem of the standard to be applied to legal specialists has not yet been
acknowledged by the same courts that for years have required a higher duty of care of
medical specialists ....
Id. at 1312 (footnotes omitted). For an extended discussion of the professional negligence stan-
dard, see Comment, supra note 8.
There is, however, recent indication that a higher standard for lawyers is being defined. In
Wright v. Williams, 47 CaL App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975), the California Court of Ap-
peals held that:
One who holds himself out as a legal specialist performs in similar circumstances to
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son, the plaintiff did not receive assistance commensurate with that
standard, he should be entitled to recover for breach of an express
warranty.
In the context of implied warranties, it is clear that lawyers may be
considered "merchants" for purposes of the Code.93  Most courts, how-
ever, have been unwilling to extend implied warranty liability to pro-
fessionals.94 As noted, some of the justifications for this reluctance are
that professionals are not engaged in a commercial enterprise,95 they
cannot advertise their services,96 and there is no analogous mass pro-
duction of goods or services.9 7  Hence, according to these courts, be-
cause the professional does not perform routine or mechanical services,
but rather must apply his best judgment to unique circumstances, he
engages in a noble venture removed from the blight of the commercial
world.98
Although this perspective might have been true in the past, it is inap-
plicable to today's advertising attorney. There can be little question
that the lawyer who advertises in a local newspaper is as involved in
the commercial world as is the realtor who advertises the houses he
wishes to sell. Each is promoting his product. To distinguish them on
other specialists but not to general practitioners of the law. We thus conclude that a
lawyer holding himself out to the public and the profession as specializing in an area of
the law must exercise the skill, prudence, and diligence exercised by other specialists of
ordinary skill and capacity specializing in the same field.
Id. at 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
Michigan recently enacted a statute which establishes a two-part malpractice standard applica-
ble to all professionals. 1977 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 272. The standard established for the general
practitioner is that of acceptable public practice in the community where he practices. Specialists,
however, would be required to meet the recognized standard of care within the specialty in the
community where the specialist practices or in a similar community. See Comment, New Develop-
ments in Legal Malractice, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 408, 450 (1977).
93. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 43, 47-53, 63-66, & 71 supra and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Ruybe v. Gordon, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
96. See, eg., Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 NJ. 585, 596, 258 A.2d 697, 702 (1969).
97. See, eg., La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968), in which the
Third Circuit held that the doctrines of implied warranty and strict liability in tort were inapplica-
ble under the circumstances of that case. In so holding, the court noted:
Professional services do not ordinarily lend themselves to the doctrine of tort liability
without fault because they lack the elements which gave rise to the doctrine. There is no
mass production of goods or a large body of distant consumers whom it would be unfair
to require to trace the article they used along the channels of trade to the original manu-
facturer and there to pinpoint an act of negligence remote from their knowledge and
even their ability to inquire ....
Id. at 942.
98. See, e.g., Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co., 275 Ala. 35, 38, 151 So.2d 767, 771 (1963); New-
mark v. Gimbers, Inc., 54 NJ. 585, 597, 258 A.2d 697, 703 (1969).Washington University Open Scholarship
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the ground that the realtor's service is commercial while the lawyer's is
professional is to ignore the realities of the contemporary business
world. To differentiate legal services on the ground that each case is
unique fails to account for the fact that many of these advertised serv-
ices are routine and entail the use of mass produced forms. Although
even routine cases may vary somewhat, the widespread use of stan-
dardized forms for furnishing a variety of routine services minimizes
the variance.99 Also relevant is that although the plaintiff in an im-
plied warranty of merchantability claim need not prove reliance, it nev-
ertheless is reasonably foreseeable that in procuring legal assistance he
will rely on an advertisement's representations of a lawyer's skill and
expertise.1°°
Considered together, the commercial flavor of legal advertising, the
widespread use of standardized forms, and the foreseeable reliance of
the potential client make the case for extending implied warranty
standards to lawyers who advertise all the more compelling. It is only
equitable that the attorney who voluntarily injects himself into a com-
mercial forum be held, like others, to deliver on his claims.
Assuming the implied warranty of merchantability is extended to
lawyers who advertise, the next area to consider is whether the services
rendered were "merchantable."'' As noted, merchantability does not
imply perfection. 102 Rather, the legal product must pass without ob-
jection in the trade. °3 This standard requires that an attorney who
claims to be a specialist must represent his client in a manner that simi-
lar specialists would consider to be satisfactory.' °4 The plaintiff need
not prove negligence.10 5 Further, it is irrelevant that the cause of the
lawyer's failure to render merchantable service was beyond his
control. 06
A final Code warranty that may be applicable to attorneys is the
99. The use of these standardized forms along with the advent of legal advertising may de-
crease the costs of routine legal services. See Branca & Steinberg, supra note 3, at 519 n.234;
Note, A4dvertlsin& Solicitation, andthe Profession'S Duty to Make Legal Counsel/A ailable, 81 YALEP
L.J. 1181, 1205-08 (1972).
100. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 30-35 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
103. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
104. See note 92 supra and sources cited therein. This standard requires that the lawyer's
performance pass without objection in the trade. In the legal context, "trade" should be defined
as those lawyers who specialize in the advertising attorney's area of expertise.
105. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
106. Id.
[Vol. 1978:443
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/1
Number 3] LEGAL ADVERTISING AND WARRANTY LIABILITY 465
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 10 7 Although this
warranty will not ordinarily arise from a legal advertisement or solici-
tation, it may be available in limited situations. To illustrate, suppose
a lawyer advertises that he is a tax specialist. The advertisement is
read by a businessman considering a corporate merger who then con-
tacts the advertising attorney and inquires whether he is a corporate tax
specialist. Upon receiving an affirmative answer, the businessman
hires the attorney. It is at least arguable that the attorney has im-
pliedly warranted the fitness of his services for the particular purpose of
obtaining specialized advice on corporate tax matters. That is, the cli-
ent is relying upon the attorney's stated expertise, and the attorney has
reason to know of the client's reliance on this expertise for the particu-
lar purpose of securing advice on whether and how to consummate the
merger. Note, however, that the warranty did not arise from the ad-
vertisement alone. Rather, the advertisement activated the client's re-
liance process and facilitated the initial contact with the lawyer. The
warranty then arose from the resulting communication between the at-
torney and the client.
If a lawyer advertises that he is a specialist, he should be held to have
warranted that clients will receive a commensurate level of perform-
ance. Anything less will enable him to exploit the benefits of the com-
mercial world without adhering to its obligations. As shown, price and
specialty advertising may give rise to express and implied warranties.
Further, if "quality" advertising is subsequently approved, 08 any such
unfulfilled statement may result in warranty liability." In light of
these considerations, it is prudent for the professional who advertises to
embark upon that commercial road in a most cautious and circumspect
manner.
107. See note 16 supra for text and discussion of U.C.C. § 2-315.
108. As noted, the Supreme Court in Bates declined to address the issue of quality advertising.
The Court, however, noted that such advertising may mislead the client and thus may warrant
restriction. 433 U.S. at 372-75; see notes 85-86 supra.
109. Statements that give rise to a warranty are distinguishable from "puffing." See Thomp-
son Farms, Inc. v. Como Feed Prods., 366 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); Klages v. General
Ordinance Equip. Corp., 240 Pa. Super. 356, 367 A.2d 304 (1976). The consumer usually has
reason to believe that the representations made in an attorney's advertisement are true statements.
They should, therefore, be strictly construed against the professional. The puff-warranty distinc-
tion frequently involves an assessment of the reasonableness and the foreseeability of the con-
sumer's reliance. Reliance on attorney advertising by the potential client is usually reasonable
and foreseeable. Accordingly, the attorney should be held to his representations. See generall,
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 277-82.Washington University Open Scholarship
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although lawyers (and other professionals) have a first amendment
right to advertise, its exercise may entail the application of warranty
standards. By actively engaging in advertising and thereby triggering
consumer reliance, it is only equitable that the lawyer, like others in the
commercial world, be held to have warranted his product. The extent
of this warranty should depend on the nature of the representations
made in the advertisement. Representations of specialty should im-
pose an affirmative obligation to render merchantable specialty legal
services. If, for any reason, the client does not receive services com-
mensurate with that level of performance, his attorney should be liable
for breach of warranty. Representations relating to the quality of serv-
ice offered should impose yet more stringent obligations. If statements
are made that the client will receive expert, advantageous legal repre-
sentation at a low cost, then the client is entitled to precisely that quali-
ty of performance at that cost. Anything short of this expectation
should subject the attorney to warranty liability.
In summary, it is clear that representations made in advertisements
may impose liability upon professionals. Attorneys and other profes-
sionals should be cognizant of this possibility. Indeed, it can be said
that although the rule for those seeking legal services has been the an-
cient standard of caveat emptor, the new standard for attorneys who
advertise may well be caveat advocatus-let the lawyer beware!
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